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 Water resources and national security policies have become entwined in several 
international river basins.  This linkage creates additional constraints for the water 
resources professional that might be avoided if it were possible to predict where such 
linkages could occur and to adopt policies to forestall that eventuality.  The author 
summarizes four international river basin case studies, suggests common factors, reviews 
other authors’ suggested indicators of conflict and suggests several more indicators and a 
framework that may refine predictions of a linkage between national security and water 
resources. 





 The occurrence of a linkage between water resources and national security is 
probably much more significant to water resources professionals than it is to a country’s 
national security apparatus.  For the national security professional, this linkage means 
that water is another factor to be dealt with in the effort to protect a nation and its 
interests.  For the water resources professional, concerned with, among other things, 
optimal use and allocation, the linkage represents a major additional constraint and a 
factor that tends to be a trump card in policy debates.  The arena of national security 
policy is normally secretive and often enigmatic.  Policies are generally cautious and risk-
averse, concerned more with certain security than optimization or cost-efficiency.  To 
some, an attractive aspect of inclusion in the national security policy arena may be 
increased attention.  Additional funding may become available to a sector deemed critical 
to a nation’s security.  For example, funding and construction of the Interstate Highway 
System in the United States, beginning during the Eisenhower administration, was tied to 
national security. 
 On the other hand, an examination of the effects of a national security linkage on 
a nation’s water resources policy reveals several undesirable possibilities.  Possible 
drawbacks may include restrictions on information sharing, limits or prohibitions on 
cooperation with neighbor states, increased infrastructure costs, constraints on 
development options and secondary effects in agriculture, energy and industry.  Each of 
the case studies reported below shows evidence of at least one of these undesirable 
effects resulting from a strong national security-water relationship.  From a water 
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resources perspective, avoiding these problems, especially in developing countries, 
presents perhaps the strongest argument for knowing the likelihood – and if possible 
preventing – a water resources-national security policy linkage. 
 
Methods Used 
 This project reviewed a number of published works that deal with conflict and 
water resources from a basin-wide, country-specific or thematic perspective.  Many of 
these works were used primarily as historical sources, but several provided invaluable 
insight and conclusions relevant to a discussion of linked national security and water 
resources policies.  Results of the analyses are presented in case study summaries of 
selected countries in four international river basins – the Nile, Jordan, Indus and Tigris-
Euphrates.  As the summaries reflect, the analysis concentrated on countries in each basin 
where the relationship between water resources and national security policy was deemed 
informative.  This is not to suggest that these countries are the only ones in their 
respective basins where a national security-water relationship is evident. For example, in 
the Nile basin only Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are considered, neglecting the other seven 
basin countries.  The decision not to discuss some countries reflects a desire for brevity 
and clarity and a judgment, after initial review, that the additional discussions would not 
add significant new concepts or factors to the analysis. 
 Drawing from the case studies, a number of common causal/contributing factors 
are presented followed by a summary of what others have suggested as indicators of 
conflict in international river basins.    These indicators are discussed with regard to their 
possible utility in forecasting the likelihood of a water resources-national security policy 
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linkage in countries where that does not yet exist.  Finally, additional indicators and a 
framework for analysis are presented, applied to the case studies and discussed. 
 
Case Studies 
The Nile River Basin: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt  
 The Nile Basin includes the sub-basins of two main tributaries, the White Nile 
and the Blue Nile.  Flowing north from Lake Victoria, which sits astride the Equator, the 
White Nile carries water from Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo into Sudan.  The Sobat River from Ethiopia joins the 
White Nile in southern Sudan.  Further north at the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, the Blue 
Nile, also originating in Ethiopia, joins the White Nile and the two become the Nile 
proper.  The Atbara, flowing from both Ethiopia and Eritrea, empties into the Nile in 
northern Sudan.  More than a hundred kilometers before it crosses the Sudan-Egypt 
border, the Nile becomes Lake Nasser, a 6000 km2 reservoir created by Egypt’s Aswan 
High Dam.  Below the dam, the Nile continues north, with virtually all of Egypt’s 
development and population contained in its narrow valley.  The Nile forms a large delta 
and empties into the Mediterranean Sea some 6,650 kilometers from the source of the 
White Nile.  For an excellent and concise description of the physical, economic and 
political geography of the Nile Basin, see Elhance, Hydropolitics in the 3rd World (1999). 
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 Perhaps the two largest reasons for the 
water resources-national security link in the Nile 
Basin are Egypt’s complete dependence on the 
river and its status as a regional power.  Elhance 
states in a discussion of the Nile Basin that its 
hydropolitics can be understood only if it is 
recognized outright that without the Nile’s water, 
Egypt would cease to exist as a viable state.  
Certain figures support his claim; underground 
aquifers, Egypt’s other major source of water, 
supply only 4% of Egypt’s water.1  It follows 
logically that if a regional power considers water 
resources an element of its national security, 
other states within its sphere of influence will 
follow suit.  This is the case in the Nile Basin. 
 Though development along the Nile in 
Egypt has taken place for centuries, it was only in 
the early twentieth century that the prospect of 
development in upstream areas began to threaten 
significant effects on Egypt’s water resources.  While most of the countries in the basin 
were under European colonial rule2, there was minimal conflict over water.  Egypt was 
                                                 
1 Elhance (1999), 57. 
2 Ethiopia is the only state in the region that was never truly colonized, though Italy occupied the region of 
the country that is now independent Eritrea.  Italy did make some agreements with other European powers 
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the first to achieve independence from colonial rule, in 1922.  In 1929, Egypt signed a 
treaty with the British government securing a promise that Britain (then governing 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan) would undertake no development impacting the 
Nile’s flow into Egypt without Cairo’s prior assent.  When upstream states gained 
independence, starting with Sudan in 1956 and followed shortly thereafter by all the other 
basin states except Eritrea3, leaders of these new countries all repudiated the restrictions 
of the 1929 Treaty.   
 At this point, unsure about the new neighboring governments and faced with 
likely upstream development, Egypt first openly linked water and national security during 
a dispute with Sudan.4  The brief period of hostility with Sudan was ended when a 
Sudanese military coup installed a government friendly to Egypt.  The newfound 
cooperation between Egypt and Sudan produced the Treaty of 1959, titled the 
“Agreement for Full Utilization of the Nile Waters.” It allocated the waters of the Nile 
between Egypt and Sudan, essentially ignoring the future needs of upstream countries.  
No other basin countries accept the validity of the Treaty of 1959.5  
 Egypt’s inauguration of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 (constructed with 
significant assistance from the Soviet Union) represented a major achievement for the 
nation and has since allowed Egypt to more fully exploit the waters of the Nile, with 
current usage estimated at 99% of the available flow.6  The ability of upstream states to 
affect Egypt’s water resources is underscored by the fact that 86% of the water reaching 
                                                                                                                                                 
purporting to represent all of Ethiopia, but the various governments of Ethiopia have never acknowledged 
the validity of any of these agreements. 
3 Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a nearly 40 years of armed resistance to 
Ethiopian rule. 
4 Klare (2001), citing Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, 77-86. 
5 Klare (2001), 153 and Elhance (1999), 70. 
6 Kiser (2000), 36. 
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the Aswan High Dam originates in Ethiopia.7  Ethiopia has done little to develop its own 
water resources potential in the northern highlands where this flow originates.  This is 
certainly due in some part to a long civil war followed by several shorter wars with 
neighboring Eritrea, but Egypt’s inclusion of water in its national security policy has no 
doubt also had a large influence.  In 1978 when the Ethiopian government announced 
plans to divert water from the Blue Nile for irrigation, Egypt threatened to bomb any 
facilities that would impede the Nile’s flow.8  Doubtless these threats weighed heavily on 
Ethiopian policy makers as Egypt made peace with Israel that same year and became a 
recipient of a large continuing stream of aid from the United States.  This aid, much of it 
in the form of military hardware, has widened the power gulf between Egypt and the 
other Nile Basin countries.   
 While Egypt’s significant economic9 and military advantages may have served to 
prevent armed conflict over water for several decades, this stability continues at the 
expense of potential benefits in the upstream countries.  Ethiopia and several other 
upstream states have significant undevloped hydroelectric and/or irrigation potential.   
Perhaps the most undesirable result of the water resources-national security linkage in the 






                                                 
7 Kiser (2000), 36. 
8 Klare (2001), 158 citing Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East. 
9 2002 per capita GDP: Egypt: $4,000, Sudan: $1,400, Ethiopia: $700  (CIA World Factbook) 
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The Jordan River Basin: Syria, Israel and Jordan  
 The Jordan Basin includes portions of 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan as well as 
the disputed territories of the West Bank and 
Golan Heights.  Sources of the upper Jordan 
River include the Hasbani River (Lebanon), 
the Banyas River (Syria and the Golan 
Heights), the Dan River (Israel), and the 
Yarmuk River.  The Yarmuk drains areas of 
Jordan and Syria, flowing along Jordan’s 
northern border with Syria and the Golan 
Heights until it reaches the Jordan River.   
The Hasbani, Banyas and Dan contribute to 
the inflow to the Sea of Galilee, also known as Lake Tiberias or Kinneret.  Ten 
kilometers below the Sea of Galilee, the lower Jordan receives significant flow from the 
Yarmuk.  The lower Jordan River continues southward, forming the border between 




e ng into the Dead Sea. 
 As seen in the Nile Basin, events of the last century have caused a linkage 
between water resources and national security policy.  Following World War I and the
breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was divided into British and French 
Mandates.  The French granted independence to Lebanon in 1943 and to Syria in 1946.  
British Mesopotamia and Palestine became Iraq (1932), Jordan (1946) and Israel (1948). 
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When the United Nations voted to divide Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas, the A
areas included the West Bank, which Jordan occupied shortly thereafter in the A
Israeli war of 1948.   Jordan formally annexed the West Bank in 1950, but this 
annexation was not widely recognized and Jordan ha
rab 
rab-






pt’s President Nasser to abandon the Johnston 
he 
y 
steadfastly opposed by the Arab states, and in 1953 Syrian artillery fired on construction 
                                                
c n the West Bank to the Palestinian people.   
 In the 1950’s, Israel, Syria and Jordan all crafted plans for use of the waters in the 
Jordan Basin.  The United States, hoping to score a victory for cooperation in the region
also crafted a plan, known as the Johnston Plan, in cooperation with Israel, Jordan and 
Syria.  After securing tentative agreement from technical representatives of all side
plan fell apart when rejected by political leaders.  Reportedly, Israeli leaders were 
unwilling to sign away any rights to the upper Jordan and Sea of Galilee and Arab leader
were unwilling to agree to anything that could be interpreted as recognition of the Sta
of Israel.10  Another view is that the U.S. refusal in 1956 to fund construction of the 
Aswan High Dam in Egypt caused Egy
Plan, thus ruling out Arab approval.11 
 Exclusive development plans continued, with Israel constructing its National 
Water Carrier, a system of canals, pump stations and tunnels, to transport water from t
Sea of Galilee to coastal areas and southern Israel.  This transfer is significant from a 
technical standpoint because it moves water out of the basin, going against a commonl
stated international principle that water should not be diverted outside a, international 
basin unless all states in the basin have enough water.  The National Water Carrier was 
 
10 Klare (2001), 168. 
11 Cooley (1984), 12-13. 
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sites, forcing relocation of some facilities.12  Separately, Jordan proceeded, aided by an 
agreement with Syria and funding from the United States, with a plan to divert irrigation 
water from the Yarmuk River upstream from Israel.  The East Ghor Canal was built to 
transport the water south to agricultural areas.  The East Ghor Canal was completed in 
1963 and the Israeli National Water Carrier in 1964.   
 The Arab states and Israel were each unhappy with the other’s diversion plans and 
tensions rose throughout the early 1960’s.  At an Arab summit in 1960, unhappiness with 
Israel’s National Water Carrier led to an “All-Arab” plan to divert water from tributaries 
of the upper Jordan, effectively routing it around the intake of the National Water Carrier.  
Learning of the plan, Israeli leaders issued stern warnings that Israel would treat any 
diversion as an attack on its vital interests and a threat to peace.  When construction of 
the diversion works began four years later, Israel made good on its threat, repeatedly 
bombing and shelling the construction sites.  Confrontation between Israel and the Arab 
states, primarily Syria and Egypt, grew over this and other issues, culminating in the Six 
Day War of June 1967.   
 In the Six Day War, Israel occupied the Golan Heights and the West Bank, 
accomplishing what no other nation has done by force in recent times: changing its status 
from lower to upper riparian.  Occupation of the Golan Heights gave Israel control over 
the headwaters of the Banyas as well as complete control over the shores of the Sea of 
Galilee and strategic terrain essential to protect key low-lying water resources in Israel.  
By denying this terrain to Syria, Israel ensured the security of its most critical and 
vulnerable water resources. 
                                                 
12 Cooley (1984), 10. 
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 Occupation of the West Bank gave Israel increased access to the Jordan River, but 
more important to Israel’s water security, it gave Israel control over the Mountain 
Aquifer.  This aquifer underlies most of the western half of the West Bank and flows 
toward Israel.  Not only does occupation of the West Bank give Israel increased access to 
the Mountain Aquifer, but it allows Israel to control all withdrawals from the aquifer and 
limit activities that might pollute the groundwater before it flows into Israel. 
 Since 1967, discussion of the occupied territories and demands for their return to 
Syria and the Palestinian people has overshadowed the debate over water resources.  To 
some extent the occupation has made the water situation more stable, though not more 
equitable, in the Jordan Basin.  Since Israel is both the most powerful state and an upper 
riparian (with the exception of the Hasbani and Yarmuk rivers), there is less chance of 
conflict over water.  Nonetheless, all the countries concerned still have significant and 
growing water needs in the face of a finite or perhaps diminishing supply.  Water 
resources policy in the region remains interwoven with national security and national 
identity.   
 John Cooley, a longtime correspondent in the Middle East, writes that the water 
issue was central to the formation and the policies of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and Yasir Arafat’s group, Fatah.  He concludes that it was no 
accident that the first attack carried out by Fatah against Israel was an attempt to sabotage 
the Israeli National Water Carrier in December 1964.13  Tension between Palestinian 
groups and Israel continued into the 1980’s and spread to include larger portions of the 
Palestinian population when the first intifadeh began in 1987.  Concern over unfair water 
                                                 
13 Cooley (1984), 15. 
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policies in the occupied territories and the Israeli “usurpation” of water is cited as a one 
of many factors fueling the uprising.14   
 The 1990’s saw renewed peace efforts and some limited results.  Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority recognized each other in 1993.  Jordan and Israel signed a peace 
treaty in 1994 that included a section on water which allocated the flow of the Yarmuk 
between the two countries.  In 1995 the Palestinian Authority and Israel signed an Interim 
Agreement that acknowledged certain Palestinian rights to water and allowed the 
Palestinian Authority a role in water allocations in the West Bank.  Since 1995, the 
general situation in the occupied territories has worsened and there has been little 
additional progress on the diplomatic front.  The second intifadeh began in 2000 and 
continues as of this writing.   
 The strong policy linkage between water resources and national security that 
exists in the Jordan Basin needs to be viewed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Water concerns contribute to the conflict itself, but the conflict also has an effect on 
water policies, causing basin states and the Palestinian people to view water in the 
context of national security.    
 
The Indus River Basin: India and Pakistan  
 Though the primary issue of contention between India and Pakistan has long been 
the status of disputed Kashmiri territory, their water policies were for a short time linked 
to national security.  Some analysts conclude that water policy in the Indus Basin may 
                                                 
14 Klare (2001), 171. 
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again enter the national security arena if current trends of rapid population growth and 
environmental decline lead to food shortages in the future.15 
 The Indus River has its 
source in western Tibet and flows 
briefly through Chinese territory 
before entering Indian controlled 
Kashmir and then flowing into 
Pakistan.  In northern Pakistan it is 
joined by the Kabul River, which 
flows out of Afghanistan.  Four 
other rivers which arise in northern 
India or Indian controlled Kashmir, 
the Jhelum, Ravi, Chenab and Sutlej combine to form the Panjnad River, which joins the 
Indus in central Pakistan.  From this point, the Indus remains in Pakistan along its course 
to the Arabian Sea. 
 Modern development of water resources in the Indus Basin began under British 
colonial rule in 1859.  By 1915, canals crisscrossed the basin, providing for irrigation and 
flood control.  In one of the earliest examples of basin-wide management, the British 
harnessed much of the potential of the rivers to greatly increase the region’s agricultural 
productivity.  In August 1947, the partition of colonial India into the states of India and 
Pakistan resulted in a split in the basin’s water resources.  The territory of Pakistan 
included the majority of the basin’s canal network and agricultural land, but the upper 
reaches of the Indus as well as the headwaters of all the major tributaries of the Panjnad 
                                                 
15 Klare (2001), 188. 
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lay in India.  This placed India, already the more powerful state, in the position of upper 
riparian, though most of the benefit of the basin’s waters was given to Pakistan. 
 A temporary Standstill Agreement governed operation of the canal network, but 
when it expired on March 31, 1948, India stopped supplying water to several key canals 
flowing to Pakistan.  The results were crop failure in over one million acres of irrigated 
Pakistani farmland and a widespread famine.16  Pakistanis reacted angrily with calls for 
military action, but the Indians downplayed the issue as a misunderstanding.  
Negotiations led to another temporary agreement.  In 1952 the World Bank began 
mediating the contentious dispute.  Eight years of mediation finally produced the historic 
Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between the two countries.  Though the treaty did not re-
establish basin-wide development and management, its scheme of divided operation has 
held up through a war in 1965 and continuing tension between the two states.17  To date, 
it has successfully suppressed the linkage between water resources and national security 
in the Indus Basin.   
 
The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: Turkey, Syria and Iraq  
 Both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers arise in Turkey’s southeastern highlands and 
eventually flow into the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.  The Euphrates flows south from Turkey 
into Syria, flowing then southeast through the most populated areas of the country and 
crossing into Iraq, where it continues southeast until it meets the Tigris.  The Tigris River 
flows southeast from Turkey across a short stretch of Syrian territory before entering 
Iraq.  The two rivers nearly converge in central Iraq, near Baghdad, and from there they 
                                                 
16 Klare (2001), 184. 
17 Klare (2001), 186. 
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follow generally parallel courses through southern Iraq before joining to form the Shatt-
al-Arab which flows on to the Gulf.  The border between Iraq and Iran runs down the 
center of the wide Shatt-Al-Arab for a time, and several small tributaries flowing from 
Iran join the Shatt shortly before it empties into the Gulf. 
 Syria is highly dependent 
on the Euphrates and Iraq is 
completely dependent on the two 
rivers.  Though not as dependant 
as its southern neighbors, Turkey 
has the most ambitious 
development plans for the rivers.  
The Southeastern Anatolia Project 
(commonly known by the Turkish 
abbreviation GAP) is an ongoing 
$32 billion multi-year effort involving the construction of 21 dams and extensive 
infrastructure to spur economic development and job creation in Turkey’s southeast. 
 History records numerous conflicts over and involving water in this basin – some 
more than two thousand years ago, however, these are not particularly informative in the 
context of modern water resources or national security.  Modern instances of the 
relationship between national security and water policy were brought into public view in 
1975 and 1990. 
 Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Iraq openly criticized Syria’s military losses 
on a number of occasions, and the Syrians responded by altering the flow of the 
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Euphrates to interfere with Iraqi agriculture.  In 1975 Syria impounded much of the 
spring flood to fill the reservoir behind a new dam.  Iraq, accustomed to receiving the 
entire spring flood and counting on it for its farmers, reacted with angry rhetoric.  
Tensions ratcheted up quickly.  The two countries cancelled commercial air links, 
withdrew military attachés from each other’s capitals and stationed additional armed 
troops on their shared border.  Only through mediation by the Saudi Crown Prince and 
the Soviet Union did the two countries back down and Syria agree to release additional 
water to Iraq.18  Though Saudi Arabia proposed a plan for sharing the waters of the 
Euphrates, Syria and Iraq did not reach agreement until the next crisis convinced both 
countries of the need to do so. 
 In meetings throughout the 1980’s it became clear that the claims of the three 
countries on the waters of the Euphrates significantly exceeded the average flow.  Turkey 
agreed to provide Syria a minimum flow, but the flow equaled the amount demanded by 
Iraq, which would leave Syria able to consume nothing.19   
 In late 1989, Turkey announced plans to use the entire flow of the Euphrates for 
one month to begin filling the giant reservoir behind Ataturk Dam, the largest dam in the 
GAP.  Though Syria and Iraq protested, Turkey went ahead with the diversion for exactly 
one month and the flow of the Euphrates subsided to a trickle.  Though this event 
occurred during the winter and caused little actual harm, it convinced Syria and Iraq of 
the need for a water sharing agreement.  They signed one several months later. 
 Following the Ataturk Dam incident, Iraq was occupied with its invasion of 
Kuwait and subsequent ejection by the United States and a large coalition.  Syria, less 
                                                 
18 For a more complete discussion, see Klare (2001), 176-177 and Elhance (1999), 142-143. 
19 Elhance (1999), 143. 
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occupied but unable to seriously challenge Turkey militarily, stepped up support for 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) rebels, most significantly by allowing the use of bases in 
Syria.  Throughout the 1990’s the conflict between Turkey and the PKK intensified until 
Turkey declared in 1998 that Syria’s support for the PKK constituted an undeclared war.  
Turkey moved large numbers of troops to the border region and threatened an air assault 
and ground invasion.  Regional leaders met to try to diffuse the crisis and in October 
1998 Syria agreed to close PKK bases and hand over the PKK leader to Turkey. 
 Elhance concludes that Turkey’s position as upper riparian and most powerful 
state in the basin allows it to treat the two rivers as though they are not international 
rivers to which Syria and Iraq have rights.20  Klare suggests that recent history and 
Turkish development plans for the two rivers have set the stage for a series of recurring 
crises over water in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.21  It seems clear that Syria and Iraq will 
continue to maintain a strong link between their national security and water resources 
policy, especially since Turkey appears to be continuing a development policy that gives 




 Several common factors seem to be present in all of these case studies.  Each of 
the basins contains a country or countries with arid climates and significant irrigated 
agriculture.  All basins exhibit a military and/or economic power imbalance between 
basin states.  Each basin also has significant, non-water-related disputes.  In some form or 
                                                 
20 Elhance (1999), 145.  
21 Klare (2001), 181. 
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another, development has taken place and/or is proposed that does not consider the needs 
of key basin states.  Finally, each basin has been and/or continues to be influenced by 
outside powers such as colonial powers or superpowers. 
 In the Nile Basin, Egypt is the driving force in establishing the link between water 
resources and national security.  While militarily and economically the strongest state, it 
is the most vulnerable with respect to water.  Egypt’s policies have effectively inhibited 
development of water resources in other basin countries by threatening their national 
security.  Colonial governance in the early Twentieth Century and the influence of 
superpowers during and since the Cold War has added to the power imbalance that favors 
Egypt and to the inequitable development of basin resources. 
 In the Jordan Basin, the overall Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict provide a volatile setting that combines with scarce water resources to place 
water resources firmly in the national security arena.  Using military superiority, the 
world’s leading efficient irrigation techniques and extensive engineering, Israel has 
improved its water resources position.  Unfortunately, this has come somewhat at the 
expense of Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian people.   
 India’s military dominance in the Indus Basin has been somewhat equalized since 
Pakistan revealed its own nuclear capability, but India still maintains large advantages in 
conventional military forces and economic power.  The linkage between water resources 
and national security developed rapidly in the antagonistic atmosphere that surrounded 
partition.  Another key factor was that infrastructure built in the colonial period did not 
lend itself to workable operations in the post-partition political layout of the basin. 
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 In the Tigris-Euphrates Basin the linkage between water resources and national 
security is largely based on probable future outcomes of known development plans.  
Turkey’s economic and military dominance, strong upper riparian status and willingness 
to act unilaterally has convinced downstream states that the future bodes ill for their 
water resources.  Given the dependence of Syria and Iraq on the waters of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, it is clear why each would see this as a threat to its national security. 
 Postel and Wolf suggest that three trends common in basins with water-related 
conflict may serve as indicators of possible future conflict.22  These are:  (1) An attempt 
to unilaterally develop an international river, often by a regional power.  (2) A large or 
rapid change in the physical setting (such as a new dam or irrigation scheme) or in the 
political setting (such as break-up of a country) that creates new riparians or new 
international rivers.  (3) That existing institutions or mechanisms are unable to cope with 
the change(s).   
 At first glance these seem reasonable as indicators of possible conflict.  If applied 
to each of the four basin case studies examined previously, they would forecast likely 
conflict.  In each of the basins, a link developed between water resources and national 
security policies.  So might these indicators also be used to forecast a linkage between 
water resources policy and national security policy?  How similar is the likelihood of 
conflict to the likelihood of a linkage of policies? 
 Postel & Wolf’s first two indicators, concerned with physical or political changes 
and unilateral development, apply reasonably well to a forward-looking analysis.  
Though political changes are not always easy to predict, one can postulate multiple 
possible outcomes of current situations and estimate the associated water resources 
                                                 
22 Postel & Wolf (2001), 63-64. 
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effects of each.  Predicting the effects of physical change is comparatively 
straightforward, with the possible exception of the debated issue of climate change.  
Uncertainty notwithstanding, policy makers may well find that unilateral development 
and physical or political change remain useful indicators of likely conflict in international 
river basins.  These indicators should also be useful in determining whether a water 
resources-national security linkage is likely. 
 Unfortunately, Postel & Wolf’s third indicator is not nearly as useful for a 
forward looking analysis.  It is correct to state, and fairly simple to determine from a 
retrospective analysis of conflict, that existing institutions or mechanisms were unable to 
cope with change.  The four cases examined earlier bear this trend out, but it seems to be 
a catch-all description for a multitude of unique factors.  Given the complexity of 
international relations and the uniqueness of each international river basin, how easy is it 
to determine if existing institutions or mechanisms – subject to the vagaries of 
personality, politics and bureaucracy – are capable of coping with a possible future 
change?  Even if a basin has no institutions or mechanisms set up to handle water 
disputes, might not one be created in response to a dispute?  This is essentially what 
happened in the Indus Basin.  Partition was soon followed by dissolution of the water 
resources management mechanism, but the ensuing dispute provided impetus for the 
signing of the Indus Waters Treaty.  The treaty has effectively suppressed conflict over 
water and prevented a water resources-national security policy linkage since.   
 If it is too difficult to predict in advance whether mechanisms and institutions will 
be able to cope with change, what else might one use to accurately estimate the likelihood 
of a water resources-national security policy linkage?  After all, change in some form is 
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as certain as the continuing human need for water.  The author suggests two additional 
indicators that, when used in conjunction with the two proposed by Postel and Wolf, form 
a more complete framework for predicting the emergence of a water resources-national 
security policy linkage.  The framework is summarized in the following table: 
 
I. 









An attempt to unilaterally 
develop an international river, 
often by a regional power.  
(Postel & Wolf) 
 
Significant non-water-related 
tensions exist in the basin. 
 
Major Change Scarce/Vulnerable Water  
A large or rapid change in the 
physical setting (such as a new 
dam or irrigation scheme) or in 
the political setting (such as 
break-up of a country) that 
creates new riparians or new 
international rivers.           
(Postel & Wolf) 
At least one basin state’s water 
resources are vulnerable or 
nearly fully utilized (or both). 
 
 
 In this framework if at least one indicator from each column exists, the conditions 
are present for a water resources-national security policy linkage.  The presence of three 
or four indicators signifies an even higher likelihood of such a policy linkage.  Certainly, 
there are other situational factors too complex and numerous to discuss here that will play 
into any state’s decision on whether to link policies.  The author’s hope is that a simple 
framework such as this may provide a tool for water resource professionals to assess 
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whether national security concerns are likely to impinge on water resources policy 
discussions.  A preliminary examination of this framework is possible by revisiting the 
Jordan, Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and Indus basin case studies. 
 
Framework application: Nile Basin  
 The Nile Basin offers strong past examples of unilateral development and 
scarce/vulnerable water.  Major changes and non-water tensions are less applicable to 
the past but perhaps more likely to be conditions found in the future.   
 Egypt’s unilateral development of the Aswan High Dam enabled more regulated 
and efficient usage of the waters of the Nile.  This has allowed Egypt to use more of the 
water that flows across the Sudan-Egypt border – in fact nearly all of it.  As a result 
Egypt has become a prime example of scarce/vulnerable water, with water resources that 
are near full utilization and vulnerable.  Egypt’s greatest concern with water is that 
upstream states will reduce or manipulate the flow in a way that conflicts with its usage.  
The clear linkage between Egypt’s national security policy and its water resources policy 
stems largely from this issue.   
 Considering the future of the Nile Basin, it is not clear how much the emergence 
of Eritrea as an independent state will affect water policies.  A much more worrisome 
change is the possible two-state solution to Sudan’s long-running civil war.  In the 
unlikely event Sudan were divided into a predominately Arab northern state, almost 
certain to maintain close ties to Egypt, and a predominately Christian southern state, 
more likely to oppose Egypt and perhaps side with Ethiopia, the entire political landscape 
of the Nile Basin would experience a major change.  It is unlikely that the tensions that 
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have fueled Sudan’s civil war would dissipate entirely with a two-state solution, and any 
remaining disputes would now be interstate disputes, representing non-water tensions.  
From this brief analysis, the framework would indicate that the water resources-national 
security policy linkage is likely to continue, perhaps strengthening, in the coming years.  
A fairly recent development of note is the launch in 1998 of the Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI), a “cooperative framework” including all basin states except Eritrea.  At this time, 
it is unclear whether the NBI will be successful in weakening the linkage between 
national security and water resources policies, but it appears to be a positive step in that 
direction.  
 
Framework application: Jordan Basin 
 In the latter half of the 20th century, the Jordan Basin saw conditions fitting all 
four indicators.  Looking forward, conditions appear likely to reflect at least three of the 
indicators for the near future.   
 The basin underwent major change in the 1940’s as states gained independence 
from European Mandate authority.  Formation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the three 
subsequent wars between Israel and its neighbors have been defining political changes.  
Until the mid-1990’s unilateral development was the norm in the basin, with Jordan, 
Syria and Israel each undertaking major projects at one time or another.  The Jordan basin 
is perhaps the best example of non-water tensions influencing a link between water 
resources and national security.  Finally, scarce/vulnerable water conditions are found in 
Jordan and Israel – both extremely dependent on the Jordan River. 
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 Scarce/vulnerable water conditions seem almost certain to prevail in the future 
unless desalination becomes more affordable and much more widely used.  Non-water 
tensions will persist until Israel, its Arab neighbors and the Palestinian people make 
peace.  Ironically, any such peace settlement will most likely produce new major changes 
in basin politics and political boundaries.  The riparian claims of any new Palestinian 
state are almost sure to conflict with current usage of Jordan River waters by Israel and 
Jordan.  Significant unilateral development seems like the indicator least likely to recur.  
Jordan and Israel have shown a willingness to cooperate on water projects, and Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority even cooperate to some extent in the water sector.  On the other 
hand, Israel’s recently increased interest in unilateral security solutions may cast doubt on 
this assumption. 
 
Framework Application: Indus Basin 
 Applying the framework to the Indus Basin, past conditions reflected three 
indicators.  Looking to the future, it seems likely that conditions will persist for only one 
indicator. 
 The partition and independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 represented a major 
political change for the Indus Basin.  Non-water tension over Kashmir rapidly emerged.  
When the standstill agreement for operation of the shared canal network expired in 1948, 
India curtailed flow in key canals feeding Pakistani agriculture.  This represented a major 
physical change for Pakistan.  It also highlighted Pakistan’s vulnerable water position as 
lower riparian.  Signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 has so far effectively 
suppressed the water resources-national security policy linkage. 
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 The likelihood of a reemergence of a policy linkage between water resources and 
national security in the Indus Basin looks fairly low.  Since the Indus Waters Treaty has 
effectively addressed the conditions of major change and vulnerable water resources, it 
appears that the only persistent indicator will be non-water tension over Kashmir. 
 
Framework Application: Tigris-Euphrates Basin 
 In the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, past conditions reflect all four indicators and future 
conditions may exhibit all four as well.  Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) is 
unilateral development that has had a great impact in the basin.  The diversion of 100% 
of the Euphrates’ flow for a month to fill Ataturk dam was a major physical change, 
albeit temporary, for Syria and Iraq, and it signaled Turkey’s power and willingness to 
manipulate their scarce/vulnerable water resources.  Though Turkey has not taken such 
dramatic actions again, both downstream countries remain vulnerable to Turkey’s 
continued plans to develop the rivers within its own borders.  Significant non-water 
tension existed between Turkey and Syria over the Kurdish separatist movement.  
 Looking forward, the future of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq appears to be the largest 
single source of major political change in the basin.  The recent war, occupation and 
ongoing transition to a democratic government are significant political changes for the 
region.  It remains to be seen if any new alliances will emerge in the basin.  Should Iraq 
devolve into multiple independent states rather than the federation currently envisioned, 
one of those states would almost certainly be a Kurdish majority state in the north of 
today’s Iraq.  This state would be a lower riparian from Turkey but an upper riparian with 
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respect to the remainder of Iraq.  The impact on Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics of such a 
redrawing of borders could be dramatic. 
 It is also unclear today whether the political changes in Iraq will increase, 
decrease or just change tensions in the region.  It is likely that some non-water tension 
will remain, especially between Turkey and whatever Kurdish entity eventually emerges 
in or from Iraq.  The framework indicates a high likelihood of a continuing, perhaps 
strengthening, water resources-national security policy linkage. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  
 It may not always be detrimental to progress in the water resources sector to have 
a link to national security, but in general, it will dramatically change the factors under 
consideration by policy makers.  Efficiency and sustainability may take a back seat to 
other concerns seen as more pressing to the security or interests of the state.  Therefore it 
seems useful, especially for water resources professionals, to be able to look ahead and 
determine if this linkage is likely.  It may not always be possible to avert the policy 
linkage, but it is hard to imagine a situation where early warning would not be helpful. 
 Basin-wide management is strongly advocated by many as the solution to many 
problems in international river basins, yet nations remain the primary actors and policy 
making entities in most of those river basins.  Therefore it is appropriate to consider how 
nations will formulate water resources policy vis-à-vis the other states in the basin.  
Among the many concerns that affect international relations, national security is one of 
the most forceful.  States are least willing to accept interference in their affairs or cede 
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control to any multinational organization when they judge that issues of national security 
are at stake.   
 War over water has been the subject of much discussion and writing, and while it 
may be interesting to debate whether the coming years will bring wars over water, it 
seems much more useful to consider how the policies that affect water will be made.  
Postel and Wolf make the point that trying to determine when and where the next war 
over water will happen misses the point.  They do not deny the possibility of another war 
over water in the next century, but pointing out that the last such war was 4,500 years ago 
in Mesopotamia, they assert that it is more important to recognize that scarcity of water 
causes damaging tensions within and between nations. 23   In a sense this paper looks at 
the other side of the coin and comes to a similar conclusion.  From a water resources 
perspective, it seems more useful to consider whether or not nations will treat water 
resources in the context of their national security policy.  The answer to this question will 
be much more relevant to most countries in international river basins than a debate over 
water wars.
                                                 
23 Postel & Wolf (2001), 60. 
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